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Nature of the Case
This Court granted the State's Petition for Review of the Court of Appeals'
opinion in State v. Orellana-Castro, 2014, Opinion No. 71 (Ct. App. September 2, 2014)

(hereinafter, Opinion).

The State asserts that the Court of Appeals incorrectly

interpreted I.C.R. 8(a).

However, Mr. Orellana-Castro continues to assert that the

district court erred in allowing the charges involving G.O. to be joined with the charges
involving S.0. and in failing to sever the charges. Consequently, he asserts that the
Court of Appeals correctly held that the trial court erred in failing to sever the charges.
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Additionaily, because review was granted "as to the issues presented in this
appeal," Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it
denied his motion for a mistrial after it was brought to the district court's attention that
the court appointed interpreter was knowingly providing inaccurate and incomplete
interpretation of defense witnesses.

Further, Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that the

district court abused its discretion when it did not allow Mr. Orellana-Castro to present
evidence that another individual caused G.O.'s psychological injuries pursuant to I.RE.
412.

Finally, Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts even if this Court finds that the errors

individually were harmless, that they cumulatively deprived him of his right to a fair trial.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On December 7, 2011, an Information was filed charging Mr. Orellana-Castro
with four counts of sex abuse (two involving alleged victim G.O. and two involving
alleged victim S.O.) and two counts of lewd conduct involving alleged victim G.O.
(R., pp.69-72.) Mr. Orellana-Castro entered a not guilty plea to the charges. (R., p.73.)
A Motion for Leave to Offer Evidence of [G.O.]'s Reputation Pursuant to Rules
405 and 412 was filed asserting that credibility would be an issue at trial and in order to
attack G.O.'s credibility the defense would need to offer evidence regarding G.O.'s
veracity, some of which may touch on past sexual behaviors. (R., pp.114-115.) The
State opposed the motion asserting that the 412 evidence was not admissible under the
rule. (R., pp.130-131.) After a hearing on the motion, it was determined that evidence
concerning "the sexual behavior of G.O. would not be admissible pursuant to I.R.E. 412
and that the defense was free to offer general evidence of reputation of G.O. for truth
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and honesty without evidence of specific incidences, including the sexual behavior of
G.O." (R., p.153.)
Mr. Orellana-Castro also filed a Motion to Sever and Motion for Relief from
Prejudicial Joinder.

(R., pp.112-113.)

The motion noted that the charges were

prejudicially joined because the alleged offenses occurred at different times and places,
were totally unrelated, involved different alleged victims, do not show a common plan or
scheme, and do not serve to establish any exceptions under I.R.E. Rule 404(b) for
admission of other crime, wrong or act evidence in the other cause if the cases were
severed.

(R., pp.112-113.) The State opposed the motion to sever, noting that the

alleged crimes were part of a common scheme or plan to have sexual contact with his
step-daughters and that their testimony would act to corroborate each other.
(R., pp.132-133.) In denying the motion, the court found that "the charged acts of the
defendant where sufficient to satisfy the showing of a common plan or scheme and that
there was no undue prejudice and that any prejudice could be mitigated by the jury
instructions." (R., pp.153-154.)
The case then proceeded to trial.

(R., p.241.) The State's first witness was

Yolanda Orozco, the alleged victims' aunt.

(Tr., p.287, L.9 - p.288, L.9.)

Yolanda

Orozco testified that S.O. lived with her and S.O.'s grandparents, staying for periods
longer than a week before returning to her mother and step-father's home, and that this
had been her living arrangement since S.O. was approximately four or five years old.
(Tr., p.288, L.1 - p.289, L.18.)

On one of the nights that S.O. was staying at her

grandparent's house, she was crying and Yolanda decided to ask her what was wrong;
in asking her several questions about what was bothering S.O., Yolanda became
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concerned

that the

issue was

that

Mr.

Orellana-Castro

was

touching

S.O.

inappropriately. (Tr., p.294, L6 - p.295, L.21.) The next day Yolanda went to the Crisis
Center with her sister Silvia, S.O.'s mother, and some of Silvia's other children.
(Tr., p.297, Ls.3-20.)
S.O. was the next witness. She testified that in 2011 she awoke in the family car
on the way home from Twin Falls and found Mr. Orellana-Castro's hand on her breast.
(Tr., p.312, Ls.10-16.) In the summer of 2010, S.O. went into Mr. Orellana-Castro's
bedroom to get her phone back, he held the phone tight, grabbed her arm, pulled her
into the bed, pulled the covers over her, and then teasingly asked her, "What's this?",
referring to the part of her swimsuit that was showing from under her clothes, the tie
near the neck. (Tr., p.315, L.8 - p.316, L.8.) She told him it was her swimsuit and that
he needed to let her go, he said her friend could wait, she then elbowed him, got loose,
and left the house with her brother to go to the water park. (Tr., p.316, Ls.7-16.) At that
time, Mr. Orellana-Castro was only wearing his boxers.

(Tr., p.317, Ls.19-21.) S.O.

believed that Mr. Orellana-Castro was trying to untie her swimsuit. (Tr., p.318, Ls.4-7.)
S.O. also testified about another time that something happened in Mr. OrellanaCastro's bedroom. (Tr., p.319, L.15 - p.321, L.14.) She said that when she was five,
she was playing hide and seek and was in Mr. Orellana-Castro's bedroom hiding when
he came in. He then locked the door, carried her on to the bed, tried to take off her
shirt, and then started hugging her. (Tr., p.320, Ls.8-23.) G.O. was looking for S.O.
and started looking under the door so Mr. Orellana-Castro hid S.O. by the bed and told
her to tell G.O. that she had been hiding there.
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(Tr., p.321, Ls.1-8.)

Later, S.O.

changed her testimony and stated that Mr. Orellana-Castro took off her top during the
incident. (Tr., p.378, Ls.3-22.)
The State then presented the testimony of Deysi Orozco, the girls' aunt, who
testified about her general involvement in the case after she learned that something
inappropriate may be going on, including confronting the girls' mother, Silvia.
(Tr., p.381, L.17 - p.395, L.2)

Tania Nelson, the mother of one of G.O.'s friends,

testified that information was disclosed to her by G.O. and that she informed G.O.'s
school counselor about what G.O. had told her.

(Tr., p.395, L.19 - p.400, L.9.)

Sergeant Rickey Cowen testified about his involvement in investigating the case,
primarily discussing his interviews of both G.O. and S.O. at Valley School. (Tr., p.407,
L.1 -- p.427, L.10.)
The State presented the testimony of several witnesses who provided counseling
or mental health assessments for G.O. The first of such witnesses was Joan Kauffman.
(Tr., p.439, Ls.1-9.) Ms. Kauffman began her testimony by discussing how forensic
interviews are conducted and what normal behavior is for children that have been
abused, specifically in regards to the way they disclose the abuse. (Tr., p.440, L.14 p.448, L.13.) Ms. Kauffman conducted an interview of G.O. at CARES and had G.O.
complete a trauma screening checklist. (Tr., p.448, L.14 - p.458, L.9.) G.O.'s results
showed that she had "very high" anxiety and depression, some anger, worry about
someone killing her, a bit of "suicide worry," a lot of sexual preoccupation, and "very
high" sexual distress. (Tr., p.458. Ls.2-9.) CARES referred G.O. for counseling, made
a mental health referral, and encouraged her to "get some medication for her
depression." (Tr., p.471, Ls.9-17.)
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Dr. Rick Yuvruian, a psychiatrist with St. Luke's Behavioral Heath, completed a
standard psychiatric evaluation of G.O. (Tr., p.496, Ls.1-25.) Dr. Yuvruian diagnosed
G.O. with depression not otherwise specified and post-traumatic stress disorder.
(Tr., p.503, Ls.14-·17, p.507, Ls.14-22.)

Eric Call, a licensed clinical social worker,

completed a mental health assessment on G.O. (Tr., p.534, Ls.1-23.) He diagnosed
G.O. with major depression, severe with psychotic features, and post-traumatic stress
disorder.

(Tr., p.536, Ls.11-17.)

Mr. Call determined that the trauma related to the

PTSD diagnosis was the reported sexual abuse by her step-father and that no other
trauma was reported to him.

(Tr., p.542, Ls.4-8.)

Jason Beard, a therapist with

Preferred Child and Family Services, discussed general symptoms and issues that
people who are the victims of sexual abuse deal with. (Tr., p.650, L.20 - p.654, L.21.)
G.O. was referred to him to discuss her reported sexual abuse and related issues.
(Tr., p.654, L.22 - p.655, L.8.)
G.O. testified that in January of 2011, Mr. Orellana-Castro came into her room,
grabbed her, took off her clothes, touched her all over including her chest, and put his
fingers and penis into her vagina.

(Tr., p.558, L.1 - p.562, L.5.)

anyone about this incident right away because she was scared.

G.O. did not tell
(Tr., p.563, L.23 -

p.564, L.5.) In July of 2010, G.O. went into Mr. Orellana-Castro's bedroom to look for
her brother. Once inside, Mr. Orellana-Castro closed and locked the door, threw her
onto the bed, took off her clothes, touched her breast and legs, sucked on her breasts,
and put his penis into her vagina and anus. (Tr., p.564, L.6 - p.567, L.11.) G.0. told
her mother about what had happened; Silvia and Mr. Orellana-Castro got into a fight,
but nothing came from it. (Tr., p.574, L.21 - p.575, L.5.) Later, in August of 2011, she
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also told her Aunt Oeysi who talked to G.O.'s mother about her concerns and the family
left to stay at the Crisis Center, but it was later decided that Mr. Orellana-Castro would
just stay in the garage and leave them alone. (Tr., p.575, L.9

p.579, L.23.) Her last

disclosure was to Ms. Nelson in October 2011, immediately prior to Mr. Orellana-Castro
being charged. (Tr., p.572, L.2 - p.573, L.4) On cross-examination, G.O. discussed
that her biological father and her mother had an abusive relationship and that she
witnessed her mother being abused as a very young child. (Tr., p.588, L.17 - p.590,
L.21.)
The State also presented the testimony of Kerry Koontz, the CARES employee
who completed an evaluation of S.O.

(Tr., p.638, L.4 - p.640, L.24.)

The trauma

symptom checklist completed after the interview did not raise any concerns, but it was
recommended that S.O. complete counseling. (Tr., p.645, L.9 - p.646, L.5.)
At the close of the State's evidence, defense counsel requested that a directed
verdict be entered on Count V, the incident involving S.O. being pulled onto the bed,
because the evidence presented did not show any sexual touching or that the actions
were completed with the requisite intent. (Tr., p.675, L.19 - p.678, L.13.) The motion
was denied. (Tr., p.678, L.14 - p.680, L.5.)
Mr. Orellana-Castro called several witness. Deborah Gabardi, executive director
of the Crisis Center, testified that she keeps the records for the Crisis Center and
supplied the relevant information necessary to allow for the admission of Defendant's
Exhibit 201, a Resident Update Sheet completed when Silvia came to the center.
(Tr., p.688, L.1 - p.693, L.10.) Ms. Nelson was re-called and testified that G.O. told her
that the abuse by Mr. Orellana-Castro had been going on since November of 2010.
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(Tr., p.701, L.16- p.704, L.13.) Mr. Jeremy Sudik testified that Mr. Orellana-Castro was
a good employee and had a reputation for being truthful. (Tr., p.752, L.·1 - p.754, L.22.)
Ms. Maria Orozco, the grandmother of the alleged victims, testified that when
Silvia and the girls' biological father lived together, he used drugs and was a heavy
drinker. (Tr., p.712, L.19 - p.713, L.23.) She provided a history of when the family
moved to Idaho and when Silvia met Mr. Orellana-Castro.

(Tr., p.715, L.1 - p.717,

L.25.) When the families lived in the same apartment complex, Ms. Orozco never saw
anything out of the ordinary or improper between either Mr. Orellana-Castro and G.O. or
S.O. (Tr., p.718, Ls.11-19.) She noted that Mr. Orellana-Castro appeared to devote
himself to his family and was not a man who drank alcohol.

(Tr., p.720, Ls.2-11.)

Ms. Orozco noted that S.O. had lived with her off and on throughout her life and never
said anything to her about being mistreated by Mr. Orellana-Castro. (Tr., p.720, L.16 p.723, L.5.) She then discussed G.O. and stated that G.O. was a problem child who
gets in trouble, lies, says things that are not true, and that she has always been that
way. (Tr., p.724, L.3 - p.726, L.24.) She testified that she never saw anything related
to the current charges and that, because G.O. told lies so often, she assumed that she
was lying about the current charges as well. (Tr., p.730, Ls.1-15.) In the over ten years
that Ms. Orozco has known Mr. Orellana-Castro she has always gotten along with him
well, she believes he is a good person, a good father, and a well behaved person.
(Tr., p.735, L.13-p.736, L.16, p.749, Ls.3-9.)
Adan Coria testified that he is acquainted with Mr. Orellana-Castro and his
family, that he believes that Mr. Orellana-Castro is a very good person, and that at the
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Partida quinceanera he saw G.O. leave with a boy from the party. (Tr., p. 757, L.1 p.761, L.20.)
At the start of the fifth day of the jury trial, defense counsel made a motion to
make an offer of proof regarding past sexual behavior of G.O. (Tr., p.766, Ls.22-25.)
Defense counsel stated that at the Partida quinceanera, G.O. had sex with a man
named Jose. (Tr., p.767, Ls.8-12.) Jose had G.O. drink something that caused her to
lose consciousness or be dizzy and G.O. did not understand what was happening.
(Tr., p.767, Ls.13-17.)

Although G.O. has always had problems in the past, those

problems have magnified since the incident with Jose; her symptoms of anxiety,
sleeplessness, anger, and so on have increased.

(Tr., p.767, Ls.20-25.)

Counsel

wanted to discuss the sexual activity with Jose to offer an alternative explanation for
G.O.'s psychological injury and the resulting effects. (Tr., p.768, Ls.11-14.)
The State objected asserting that the injury contemplated by I.R.E. 412 is a
physical injury. (Tr., p.769, Ls.5-10.) Defense counsel responded that post traumatic
stress disorder is an injury, that several State's experts testified that it is symptomatic in
this case, that this evidence tends to explain why G.O. is suffering from these factors,
and that this information is critical to the defense's case. (Tr., p.770, Ls.17-24.)
The district court expressed some concern that the sexual contact with Jose was
not "subsequent behavior," then determined that under I.R.E. 412, the injury must be a
physical injury not an emotional injury, and noted that the appellate courts "have not
held that the defense can create such a scenario to allow for the introduction of 412
evidence." (Tr., p.773, L.8 - p.774, L.22.)
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Defense counsel also raised concerns that the interpreter, Ernie Ha!e, was not
providing a verbatim interpretation of the witnesses' testimony.

(Tr., p. 775, L.18 -

p.776, L.9.) The interpreter, Mr. Hale, was then sworn and admitted that he did not
provide an accurate, verbatim translation. (Tr., p.777, L.2 - p.778, L.7.) The interpreter
was then asked by the district court if he promised to translate everything from now on
verbatim; Mr. Hale responded that he would. (Tr., p.780, L.20 - p.781, L.1.)
Defense counsel then asserted that he was being informed that the inaccurate
interpretation had occurred on more than a couple of occasions. (Tr., p.781, Ls.2-7.)
The district court then found that the interpreter testified under oath it only occurred on
one or two occasions, and that the gist of Ms. Orozco's testimony was communicated to
the jury.

(Tr., p.781, Ls.8-23.)

Defense counsel then made a motion for mistrial.

(Tr., p.783, L.16 - p.784, L.8.) The State objected. (Tr., p.784, L.10 - p.785, L.25.)
The Court denied the motion for mistrial. (Tr., p.786, L.8 - p.788, L.3.)
Silvia Orellana, the alleged victim's mother, testified about her abusive marriage,
that G.O. witnessed the abuse and was also physically abused.

{Tr., p.793, L.8 -

p.797, L.10.) She noted that Mr. Orellana-Castro was not abusive and treated her well.
(Tr., p.799, L.13 - p.800, L.7.) Ms. Orellana was sexually abused as a child and knew
some symptoms of abuse and she did not ever see any signs that her children were
being sexually abused. (Tr., p.805, L.5 - p.806, L.24.) She stated that she never saw
any stains on the sheets or couch where the alleged abuse of G.O. had occurred.
(Tr., p.808, L.23 - p.811, L.14.) Ms. Orellana testified that G.O. had a reputation of
being a liar. (Tr., p.833, Ls.17-20.) Near the time of Mr. Orellana-Castro's arrest, a boy
named Jose called for G.O.; after he called, Ms. Orellana had a conversation with G.O.
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about the phone call, and G.O. made threats stating they would regret not giving her the
telephone.

(Tr., p.841, L.1 - p.843, L.23.)

She also noted that quite a bit before

Mr. Orellana-Castro's arrest, Silvia bought a pregnancy test for G.O. because she was
concerned that, because of her relationships with other men, G.O. was pregnant.
(Tr., p.879, L.1 -- p.880, L.7.)
Dr. Ryan Roberts testified that he saw G.O. for abdominal pain in August of 2011
and that he specifically asked G.O. if she was sexually active. (Tr., p.891, L.10 - p.895,
L.11.) G.O. denied being sexually active. (Tr., p.895, Ls.3-5.)
The defense's last witness was Mr. Orellana-Castro. Although he testified to a
great deal of information, most notably, he denied any sexual contact with either G.O. or
S.O. (Tr., p.916, L.19 - p.917, L.6, p.919, L.11 - 920, L.3, p.921, L.11 - p.923, L.14,
p.928, L.16-p.930, L.21, p.936, Ls.16-25, p.944, L.21 - p.945, L.1, p.972, L.6- p.973,
L.11.) Following Mr. Orellana-Castro's testimony, the defense rested.
The State then called several rebuttal witnesses. Emily Gonzales testified that
the narrative from the Crisis Center, Defendant's Exhibit 201, was a translation of what
Silvia told her that day. (Tr., p.976, L.1 - p.980, L.9.) Brian Hardy testified that when
G.O. had been sent to the office, she lied to try to get out of the situation, but no more
than any other similarly situated student.

(Tr., p.983, L.6 - p.985, L.20.)

Fabian

Orozco, Silvia's brother and the alleged victim's uncle, testified that about a year and a
half ago, prior to Mr. Orellana-Castro being arrested, Silvia had told him about concerns
that Mr. Orellana-Castro was acting inappropriately with G.O. (Tr., p.987, L.1 - p.991,
L.10.) G.O. was recalled and testified that she had lied to her doctor about not being
sexually active. (Tr., p.997, L.1 - p.1001, L.20.) S.O. was also recalled and stated that
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she did not want to stay at the Crisis Center and that
not get along very well.

c;.o.

and Mr. Oreilana-Castro did

(Tr., p.1005, L.8 - p.1007, L.23.)

The State then rested.

(Tr., p.1011, Ls.21-23.)
Ultimately, the jury convicted Mr. Orellana-Castro of the four counts of sex abuse
and the jury was unable to render a unanimous verdict on the two lewd conduct
charges. (R., pp.384-385.) The district court later sentenced Mr. Orellana-Castro to a
unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed, for each of the four counts of sex
abuse, all sentences to run concurrently. (R., pp.469-475.) Mr. Orellana-Castro filed a
Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.484486.)
On appeal, Mr. Orellana-Castro challenged the joinder of the charges related to
S.O. to those related to G.O., the denial of a mistrial following inaccurate and
incomplete interpretation of witnesses' testimony, the denial of Mr. Orellana-Castro's
request to present evidence that G.O.'s psychological issues may have been the result
of an uncharged sexual trauma, and that the errors amounted to harmless error. (See
generally, Appellant's Brief.) The Court of Appeals held that "the trial court erred by

failing to sever the charges relating to S.O. from the charges relating to G.O. and that
this error was not harmless." (Opinion, p.13.) The convictions were vacated and the
case remanded to the district court.

(Opinion, p.13.) The Court of Appeals did not

address the interpreter issue because the convictions were vacated and the case was
remanded on other grounds.

(Opinion, p.8, n.2.)

The Court also addressed the

presentation of evidence related to G.O.'s psychological issues and found that
psychological symptoms are not an injury under I.R.E. 412(b)(2)(A). (Opinion, pp.8-10.)
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However, the Court noted that on remand the district court would have to address the
right to present a defense under the Sixth Amendment if the issue were to arise in a
new trial. (Opinion, pp.12-13.) The State filed a timely Petition for Review which this
Court granted.
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ISSUES 1
1.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Orellana-Castro's Motion to Sever
and Motion for Relief From Prejudicial Joinder
the charges were
properly

2.

Did the district court err when it
to provide a "'"""' remedy once it learned
that the court appointed interpreter was knowingly providing inaccurate and
incomplete interpretation of witnesses' testimony?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it did not allow Mr. OrellanaCastro to present evidence that G.O.'s psychological issues may have been the
result of an uncharged sexual trauma, a nonconsensual sexual encounter with
Jose?

4.

Even if the above errors are individually harmless, was Mr. Orellana-Castro's
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law violated because the
accumulation of errors deprived him of his right to a fair trial?

Although the Respondent limited the Brief in Support of Petition for Review to
issues related to the joinder of the charges relating to G.O. to the charges relating to
S.O., it was noted in the brief that four issues were addressed on appeal.
(Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, p.5.) This Court granted review
"as to the issues presented in this appeal." (Order Granting Respondent's Petition for
Review.) As such, in this Appellant's Brief on Review, Mr. Orellana-Castro will address
all four issues as originally presented on appeal.
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ARGUMENT

I.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Orellana-Castro's Motion To Sever And
Motion For Relief From Prejudicial Joinder Because The Charges Were Not Properly
Joined
A.

Introduction
Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it

denied his motion to sever. Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that the charges involving his
step-daughters, G.O. and S.O., should have never been joined together because the
alleged abuse occurred at different times, in different locations, involved different types
of sexual contact, and was not part of a common scheme or plan as is required under
the Idaho Criminal Rules.
B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a court improperly joined offenses pursuant to I.C.R. 8 is a question of

law, over which this Court exercises free review.
(2007).

State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 564

Conversely, an abuse of discretion standard is applied when reviewing the

denial of a motion to sever joinder pursuant to I.C.R. 14; however, that rule presumes
joinder was proper in the first place. Id.

Mr. Orellana-Castro is challenging that the

charges were not properly joined and, as such, he asserts that this Court should
exercise free review.
C.

Relevant Factual Information
In the case at hand, Mr. Orellana-Castro filed a Motion to Sever and Motion for

Relief from Prejudicial Joinder. (R., pp.112-113.)

The motion noted that the charges

were prejudicially joined because the alleged offenses occurred at different times and
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places, are totally unrelated, involve different alleged victims, do not show a common
plan or scheme, and do not serve to establish any exceptions under LR.E. 404(b) for
admission of other crime, wrong or act evidence in the other cause if the cases were
severed. (R., pp.112-113.) In the brief in support of the Motion to Sever, it was noted
that the alleged victims clid not always live with Mr. Orellana-Castro, G.O. lived at home
and S.O. primarily lived with her grandparents; that the events charged occurred at
different times and in different locations; that the girls were different ages, G.O. being
15-years-old and S.O. being 9-years-old; that the conduct charged is of a different
nature; that the facts upon which the charges were based cannot support a claim of a
common scheme or any other 404(b) purpose; and that permitting joinder could only
serve "to prey upon the passions or prejudice of the jury." (R., pp.123-"125.)
The State opposed the motion to sever noting that the alleged crimes were part
of a common scheme or plan by Mr. Orellana-Castro to have sexual contact with his
step-daughters and that their testimony would act to corroborate each other.
(R., pp.132-133.) In a brief in support of the State's objection to the motion to sever, the
State also noted that all but one of the acts was alleged to have occurred in the family
home, that the girls were about the same size, that the girls are only separated by one
grade in school, and that the alleged events occurred over an approximately 15 month
period. (R., pp.139-140.) The State asserted again that the cases "are connected in
many ways, but most clearly by the familial relationship." (R., p.140.)
At the hearing on the motion, defense counsel reiterated that the charges
involving G.O. are entirely different than the charges involving S.O.; different conduct,
differently timed, and different locations. (Tr., p.35, Ls.1-7.) It was also noted that the
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charges do not involve conduct that was the predicate for the conduct with the other,
either S.O. to G.O. or vice versa and, as such, cannot involve a common plan or
scheme. (Tr., p.40, Ls:15-23.) The State simply asserted that the conduct was similar,
occurred primarily at the family's residence, and that the charges should remain joined
because Mr. Orellana-Castro "had a scheme or design to sexually abuse his two stepdaughters." (Tr., p.36, Ls.1-15.)
The district court found that there were similarities in the locations of the alleged
abuse, that the girls are close in age, and that while the sexual abuse of S.O. is
somewhat different than the alleged abuse of G.O., "overall the evidence is sufficient to
constitute a common scheme or plan." (Tr., p.42, L.9

p.43, L.4.) It was determined

that the potential prejudice would be alleviated by the instruction that the jury must
decide each count separately.

(Tr., p.43, Ls.2-·14.) The district court also issued a

written order on the motion to sever. (R., pp.153-154.) In denying the motion, the court
found that "the charged acts of the defendant were sufficient to satisfy the showing of a
common plan or scheme and that there was no undue prejudice and that any prejudice
could be mitigated by the jury instructions." (R., pp.153-154.)
D.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Orellana-Castro's Motion To Sever
And Motion For Relief From Prejudicial Joinder Because The Charges Were Not
Properly Joined
The legal standards for proper joinder of offenses are contained within the Idaho

Criminal Rules. Field, 144 Idaho at 565; State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784, 790 (Ct. App.
2007). Idaho Criminal Rule 13 provides that the district court may order two or more
informations to be tried together if the offenses could have been joined in a single
information. I.C.R. 13. Two or more offenses may be charged in the same information
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if the offenses, "are based on the same act or transaction or on two (2) or more acts or
transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan."
I.C.R. 8(a).

Under this standard, the charges must have a sufficient nexus between

them in order to be properly joined.

State v. Anderson, 138 Idaho 358, 361-362

(Ct. App. 2003). Whether the initial joinder was proper depends upon what is alleged by
the State, not what the proof at trial ultimately shows. Field, 144 Idaho at 565 (quoting
State v. Cochran, 97 Idaho 71, 73 (1975)). Improper joinder of charges can prejudice a

defendant because the jury may be induced to regard proof of one offense as
corroborative of the other when, in fact, no such corroboration exists. State v. Wilbanks,
95 Idaho 346, 352 (1973).
Even when joinder under I.C.R. 8(a) is interpreted broadly, the charges were
improperly joined. On review, Mr. Orellana-Castro maintains that the charges involving
G.O. and S.O. were improperly joined because the offenses do not constitute a
common plan or scheme.2

2

The State has mischaracterized the Court of Appeals' holding in the Opinion.
Contrary to the State's assertion, the Court of Appeals did not hold that whether
evidence would be admissible in each of the alleged victim's trials, if they had been held
separately, is a central question to determining whether the charges were properly
joined. (Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, pp.11-14.) Instead, the
Court of Appeals found that recent case law interpreting the legal phrase "common
scheme or plan" under I.R.E. 404(b) was also applicable to the phrase "common
scheme or plan" under I.C.R. 8. The Court found that the 404(b) case law was
persuasive and the understanding of what constituted a common scheme or plan was
the same under both 1.R.E. 404(b) and I.C.R. 8(a). The Court specifically noted that "we
consider [State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49 (2009)] as persuasive authority for determining
what amounts of a common scheme or plan for purposes of joiner." (Opinion, pp.4-5.)
As such, this holding does not alter the analysis for what charges can be joined together
to an "admissibility" question, but rather properly alters what can be considered a
common scheme or plan to comport with the current legal understanding of the phrase.
The State has also correctly asserted that case law from a variety of jurisdictions
has held that I.C.R. 8(a)'s federal counterpart should be broadly construed in favor of
18

In State v. Schwartzmiller, 107 Idaho 89, 91 (1984 ), Mr. Schwartzmiller was
convicted of three counts of lewd and lascivious conduct which took place in the late
1970's with two fourteen year old boys.

Even though the acts occurred at different

times and with different people, the Court held the counts were properly joined because
the facts demonstrated a common plan. Id. at 92.

Schwartzmiller frequented areas

where young boys may be found, befriended boys with no father figure in the home,
enticed them from their homes, lowered their natural inhibitions through the use of drugs
and alcohol, and committed sex acts upon them. Id. at 93.
In State v. Field, Mr. Field was charged with one count of lewd conduct and one
count of sexual battery. Field, 144 Idaho at 563-564. The first offense was committed
against a seven-year-old girl in 2003. Id. at 566. H.P.'s mother had arranged for H.P. to
stay temporarily with the Fields, during that stay Mr. Field asked her to sit on his lap,
she complied, and that he began to rub her stomach underneath her clothing, put his
hand underneath her underwear and "put his finger inside of [her] private." Id.

The

second offense was committed against a seventeen-year-old girl in 2001.

T.B.

Id.

testified that she and her friend were asked to housesit and babysit Field's stepdaughter
while the Fields were out of town. During this time, Mr. Field asked T.B. to lie down on
the bed next to him so that he could give her a back rub and as he was rubbing her

joinder. (Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, pp.15-17.) However,
Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that even if I.C.R. 8(a) is interpreted broadly, a broad
interpretation does not necessitate that sound legal reasoning, such as case law
determining what constitutes a common plan or scheme under the exact same phrasing
as I.RE. 404(b), should be disregarded or abandoned. Furthermore, applying the
slightly more circumscribed view regarding what constitutes a common scheme or plan
at the initial joinder stage saves time and resources. This is especially true because
giving a very broad interpretation will likely only result in the court granting relief from
prejudicial joinder at a later date.
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back, he also began to kiss her and say things like "he liked touching [her]" and "[her]
skin was soft." Id. T.B. testified that Mr. Field put his hand inside her underwear and
rubbed her entire buttocks. Id.
The State's argument was that the cases were properly joined because Mr. Field
had a plan to take advantage of underage girls that came into his home because the
"incidents occurred at different times, under different circumstances, and involved
different parties with significantly different ages." Id. The Court found that the separate
acts did not constitute part of a common scheme or plan. Id. The Court went on to note
that, "[t]here is nothing to show that at the time Field committed the offense against T.B.
he had a plan to also commit an offense against H.P. specifically, or to commit an
offense against someone he would be 'babysitting' two years later." Id. The Court also
mentioned as important factors in its decision that the offenses were not part of
continuing action against one individual or have the "striking similarities" found in
Schwartzmiller.

Id. As a result, the Court found that the joinder of the offenses was

erroneous. Id. at 567.
The basis alleged by the State for joinder of the charges in this case were that
the alleged crimes were part of a common scheme or plan for Mr. Orellana-Castro to
have sexual contact with his step-daughters and that their testimony would act to
corroborate each other. (R., pp.132-133.) This allegation is not sufficient to meet the
standard articulated in I.C.R. 8(a).

In addition, the analysis of whether charges were

part of a common plan or otherwise connected together looks to whether there existed a
continuity of action or purpose. See Field, 144 Idaho at 565. Neither the assertions
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contained in the State's objection to the Motion to Sever, nor the facts underlying the
charges, meet the legal standards for joinder.
Applying Field to the facts of his case, Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that the result
must be the same, a finding that the charges do not constitute a common plan.
Although the girls were both Mr. Orellana-Castro's stepdaughters, it is there that the
similarities end. The girls were not the same age, G.O. being 15-years-old and S.O.
being 9-years-old; both did not primarily live in the family home; the alleged abuse was
strikingly different - ranging from alleged intercourse with G.O. (Tr., p.558, L.1 - p.562,
L.5, p.564, L.6 - p.567, L.11) to touching of the breast (Tr., p.3·12, Ls.10-16) and
touching of no part of the body that is normally considered a private part of the body
with S.O. (Tr., p.315, L.8 - p.316, L.16); and the abuse occurred at different times.
Furthermore, there is no evidence supporting a common scheme or plan as there is no
evidence that at the time Mr. Orellana-Castro engaged in inappropriate conduct with
either girl he had a plan to also commit an offense against the other step-daughter.
In Field, the Idaho State Supreme Court analyzed what a common plan was for
the purposes of joinder and relied upon cases addressing common plans or schemes
under I.R.E. 404(b). Id. at 565-566. All of the cases relied upon in Field were decided
prior to the clarification provided by State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009), State v.
Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667 (2010), and their progeny. Field was the first case to offer
clarification of what constituted a common plan or scheme under the modern
understanding of I.R.E. 404(b).
In Grist, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that the "common scheme or plan"
contemplated by 1.R.E. 404(b) is "a common scheme or plan embracing the commission
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of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the
other.... " Grist, 147 Idaho at 54-55 (citations omitted). In Johnson the Court explained
that "at a minimum," this rule requires, "evidence of a common scheme or plan beyond
the bare fact that" the defendant has committed the same kind of misconduct in the
past. Johnson, 148 Idaho at 668. The Court continued, stating that, "[t]he events must
be linked by common characteristics that go beyond merely showing a criminal
propensity and instead must objectively tend to establish that the same person
committed all the acts." Id. (citations omitted).
Mr. Johnson was charged with lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor under
sixteen and the Court held that the district court erred in admitting evidence the
defendant had abused his sister when she was about the same age as the victim in the
charged offense.

Johnson, 148 Idaho at 669.

The Court found similarities in the

charged and uncharged incidents (victims were both young girls about the same age,
both victims were younger members of the defendant's family for whom the defendant
was an "authority figure," and in both cases, the abuse took the same form) to be "far
too unremarkable to demonstrate a 'common scheme or plan' in the defendant's
behavior." Id. The Court clarified that evidence showing only "generalized similarities,"
between charged and uncharged conduct, such as the victim's sex or age, or the means
by which a defendant gains access to them "is more accurately described as
inadmissible evidence merely demonstrating the defendant's predisposition for
opportunistically molesting children."

Id. at 669 n. 5 (citing Grist, 147 Idaho at 54).

Thus, to be admissible under Rule 404(b ), "evidence of prior misconduct must show
more than a superficial similarity to the nature and details of the charged conduct, but
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must instead show that the defendant's charged and uncharged conduct is linked in a
way that permits the inference that the prior conduct was planned as part of a course of
conduct leading up to the charged offense." State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 10 (2013).
In the case at hand, there is no evidence to show a common scheme or plan.
The evidence merely shows that Mr. Orellana-Castro may have engaged in other
inappropriate conduct on other occasions.

The evidence does not demonstrate a

planned course of connected behavior as is required under the modern application of
I.RE. 404(b).

The district court determined that the charges were properly joined

because they demonstrate a common scheme or plan.

In reaching its decision, the

district court noted that there were similarities in the locations of the alleged abuse and
that the girls are close in age. (Tr., p.42, Ls.9-14.) The court did recognize that the
sexual abuse of S.O. is somewhat different than the aileged abuse of G.O. (Tr., p.42,
L.22 - p.43, L.1.)

However, the similarities between Mr. Orellana-Castro's alleged

abuse of G.O. and S.O. are essentially the same or less compelling than the general
similarities in Johnson, that the victims' sex, age, and the means by which a defendant
gained access to the victims. Further, the charges are not linked in a way that provides
any inference that the conduct towards either G.O. or S.O. was planned as part of a
course of conduct leading up to the abuse of the other step-daughter. Therefore, the
charges do not show a common scheme or plan. Rather, they are merely suggestive of
Mr. Orellana-Castro's predisposition for sexually abusing underage females, precisely
the kind of character evidence barred by Rule 404. 3 As such, joinder in this case was

The State has asserted in the Brief in Support of Petition for Review that the
charges were "intertwined, and the evidence overlapping, in both [G.O. and S.O.'s]
reporting and investigation." (Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review,
3
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improper because there was an insufficient nexus pursuant to !.C.R. 8(a) and, as a
result, the district court erred when it denied the motion to sever the charges related to
G.O. from the charges related to S.O.

E.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion VVhen It Denied The Motion To Sever
And Motion For Relief From Prejudicial Joinder Because Failure To Sever The
Charges Related To G.O. From Those Related To S.O. Would Result In
Prejudice To Mr. Orellana-Castro
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court finds that the charges were properly joined,

Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that the motion to sever should have been granted because
of the prejudice he suffered as result of the charges being tried together. Idaho Criminal
Rule 14 provides that, "[i]f it appears that a defendant or the state is prejudiced by a
joinder of offenses ... the court may order the state to elect between counts, grant
separate trials of counts, . . . or provide whatever other relief justice requires."
i.C.R. 14. An abuse of discretion standard is applied when reviewing the denial of a
motion to sever joinder pursuant to I.C.R. 14. Field, 144 Idaho at 564. When reviewing
an order denying a motion to sever, the inquiry on appeal is whether the defendant has
p.23.) The alleged abuse did not share common characteristics as the alleged victims
where different ages when the abuse allegedly occurred, the alleged abuse occurred in
different locations, at totally different times, and the type of alleged abuse was
drastically different. The fact that the charges related to both alleged victims were
investigated at the same time and that both made disclosures near the same time does
not necessitate a joint trial. The investigation related to each alleged victim, while
occurring at the same time, was independent for both G.O and S.O. The alleged
victims were interviewed by police separately. (Tr., p.411, L.2 - p.412, L.10, p.412,
L.11 - p.413, L.10.) They also submitted to separate CARES interviews, conducted by
different individuals: Joan Kauffman conducted an interview of G.O. and Kerry Koontz
completed an evaluation of S.0. (Tr., p.448, L.14 - p.458, L.9, p.638, L.4 - p.640,
L.24.)
Additionally, the State's concern about being able to tell the story of how the girls
reported is not legitimate or persuasive. First, how and when abuse is reported is not
an element that must be proven at trial. Second, it would take only minimal effort for the
State to instruct its witnesses on how to discuss the disclosures without mentioning the
other alleged victim.
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presented facts demonstrating that unfair prejudice resulted from a joint tria! which
denied the defendant a fair trial. State v. Egui!ior, ·137 Idaho 903, 908 (Ct. App. 2002).
In cases such as this, Idaho appellate courts review the trial proceeding to determine
whether one or more of the following potential sources of prejudice appeared: (a) the
possibility that the jury may confuse and cumulate the evidence, rather than keeping the
evidence properly segregated; (b) the potential that the defendant may be confounded
in presenting defenses; and (c) the possibility that the jury may conclude the defendant
is guilty of one crime and then find him or her guilty of the other simply because of his or
her criminal disposition-he or she is a bad person. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has
also pointed out that joinder of similar offenses for trial may lead the jury to regard one
offense as corroborative of the other when, in fact, no such corroboration exists. State
v. Wilbanks, 95 Idaho 346, 352 (1973).

This is a case where the only evidence that the crimes occurred was statements
from the alleged victims that Mr. Orellana-Castro had inappropriate sexual contact with
them. There was no physical evidence or witnesses to the alleged conduct.

It was

clear throughout the trial that G.O. had some credibility issues. The verdicts in this case
support the notion that the jury also had concerns about G.O.'s credibility. (R., pp.384385.) If the jury had fully believed G.O., it would have entered guilty verdicts for the two
lewd conduct charges. It is also clear from the verdict that the jury did believe S.O.
Hearing testimony from both girls is tantamount to presenting character evidence which
is normally excluded due to well founded fears that a jury may find a defendant guilty
based upon the idea that if he had done something before he is more likely to do it
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again, acting in conformity with his character to engage in bad acts. 4 Mr. OrellanaCastro asserts that because of the credibility issues involved in this trial, a he said she
said case, that had the charges been separated, the verdicts may have been different.
Further, Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that there is valid concern that the jury reached a
compromise verdict in his case.

As such, he assert that for these reasons and the

reasoning articulated throughout Issue I, that the district court abused its discretion in
failing to sever the charges related to G.O. from those related to S.O.

F.

The Erroneous Joinder And Failure To Sever Are Not Harmless Beyond A
Reasonable Doubt
Mr. Orellana-Castro adopts the reasoning of the Court of Appeals regarding

harmless error:
The State's evidence in this case was not overwhelming. G.O. testified
that she had been forcibly raped, both vaginally and anally, by OrellanaCastro. S.O. testified that Orellana-Castro placed his hand under her shirt
while she was asleep in a car he was driving and that, on another
occasion, he attempted to remove her swimsuit while pulling her into his
bed. No physical evidence corroborated the alleged victims' testimony.
The improper joinder in this case led to the jury hearing potentially
prejudicial, inadmissible evidence. As noted above, whether two or more
crimes constitute parts of a "common scheme or plan" justifying joinder
4

The State has asserted that joinder was not prejudicial because evidence of the
alleged conduct with G.O. would have been admissible in the trial for alleged abuse of
S.O. to show intent. (Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, pp.30-31.)
Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that the testimony of G.O. would not have been admissible
to prove intent in S.O.'s trial. The fact that G.O. accused Mr. Orellana-Castro of raping
her does not prove that when he played with the tie of S.O.'s swimsuit, near her neck,
while she was fully dressesd, he intended the touching to be sexual. G.O.'s testimony
would be nothing more than impermissible character evidence and would be
inadmissible in a trial for the alleged abuse of S.O.
Mr. Orellana-Castro also notes the State made no argument that the testimony of
S.O.'s alleged abuse would have been admissible in G.O.'s trial. This, in and of itself, is
a concession by the State that, at a minimum, Mr. Orellana-Castro was prejudiced by
having a joint trial because the jury would have never heard S.O.'s testimony in a
separate trial for the charges involving G.O.
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under !.C.R. 8(a) is closely related to the question whether evidence of
each of the charges would be admissible under I.R.E. 404(b) in a trial of
each charge separately. We have held above that the allegations of
offenses against S.O. and against G.O. were not components of a
"common scheme or plan," and the State has urged no other basis upon
which one victim's allegations would have been admissible in a separate
trial for the alleged offenses against the other victim. The joinder, which
allowed the jury to hear this otherwise inadmissible evidence, thus leads
to the possible prejudice that Rule 404(b) is designed to avoid. Admitting
irrelevant evidence of other misconduct risks that, as stated in Eguilior,
"the jury may conclude the defendant is guilty of one crime and then find
him ... guilty of the other simply because of his ... criminal disposition."
Specific to child molestation cases, the Idaho Supreme Court has noted
that the admission of other molestation evidence risks that jurors will act
on a "belief that sexual deviancy is a character trait of especially powerful
probative value for predicting a defendant's behavior." Johnson, 148 Idaho
at 670, 227 P.3d at 924. Further, as noted in Wilbanks, the jury may have
regarded one of the victim's allegations as corroborative of the other's
when thern is no true corroborative value in the testimony.
The risk is particularly pronounced in this case because G.O.'s
credibility was heavily attacked. The defense presented testimony from
G.O.'s mother and maternal grandmother that she was dishonest. G.O.'s
mother testified that G.O. "always lied" about "certain things" and was
angry that her mother had married the defendant. G.O.'s grandmother
testified that G.O. "has always told lies" and described G.O. as willing to
get what she wanted "no matter what it takes.'' At least one juror must
have had doubts about G.O.'s veracity, for the jury was unable to reach a
verdict on the two counts charging lewd conduct with G.O. We cannot say
beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found OrellanaCastro guilty of the less serious charges of sexual abuse of G.O. if they
had not heard S.O.'s testimony also making allegations against him.
Likewise, hearing G.O.'s testimony may have influenced the jury's
view of the charges concerning S.O. As to the count involving OrellanaCastro's conduct with S.O. at his home, Orellana-Castro testified that he
was teasing and playful and that his conduct was not sexual. G.O.'s
testimony alleging forceful and overtly sexual assaults by Orellana-Castro
could have contributed to the jury's finding that Orellana-Castro acted with
intent to gratify lust or sexual desire in his actions with S.O.
The trial pitted Orellana-Castro's credibility against the credibility of
the alleged victims. On this record, we cannot say beyond a reasonable
doubt that the improper joinder of the charges did not contribute to the
verdicts. Accordingly, the convictions must be vacated.
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(Opinion, pp.6-8.)
IL

The District Court Erred When It Failed To Provide A Proper Remedy Once It Learned
That The Court Appointed Interpreter Was Knowingly Providing Inaccurate And
Incomplete Interpretation Of Witnesses' Testimony
A.

Introduction
During the presentation of defense witnesses, defense counsel noticed that a

witness, Ms. Orozco, was speaking for a long period of time and that the interpreter was
providing a very short translation. Defense counsel raised this concern to the district
court and it was promptly disregarded.

At the start of the next day of trial, defense

counsel again raised his concern to the district court.
called the interpreter, Ernie Hale, to the stand.

At that time, the district court

Mr. Hale admitted that he did not

accurately translate the testimony, noting that on at least a couple of occasions he
summarized the witness's statement, did not translate portions of the testimony, and
provided one of several answers provided by the witness. The district court determined
from the interpreter's testimony that the jury was provided with the gist of Ms. Orozco's
testimony and determined that nothing further was necessary. Defense counsel then
made a motion for a mistrial, which was denied based upon similar reasoning.
B.

Standards Of Review
A court's decision regarding

appointment of an interpreter is generally

discretionary, but a question as to whether a trial court's decision met minimum
statutory or constitutional requirements is an issue of law subject to free review.

State v. Herrera, 149 Idaho 216, 222 (Ct. App. 2009); State v. Alsanea, 138 Idaho 733,
741 (Ct. App. 2003 ). The decision whether to grant a mistrial rests within the sound
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discretion of the district cou1i and, absent an abuse of discretion, it will not be disturbed
on appeal. State v. Canelo, 129 Idaho 386,389 (Ct. App. 1996).
C.

The District Court Erred When It Failed To Provide A Proper Remedy Once It
Learned That The Court Appointed Interpreter Was Knowingly Providing
Inaccurate And Incomplete Interpretation Of V\/itnesses' Testimony
The right to an interpreter is codified in Idaho Code § 9-205 and Idaho Criminal

Rule 28. The language used in both the statute and the rule are nearly identical. Both
provide that in a "criminal action in which any witness ... does not understand or speak
the English language ... the court shall appoint a qualified interpreter to interpret .. .
the testimony of such witness ... Upon appointment of such interpreter, the .. .
interpreter shall be sworn to accurately and fully interpret the testimony given at the
hearing or trial to the best of [his or the interpreter's] ability before assuming his duties
as an interpreter." I.C. § 9-205; I.C.R. 28.
Idaho has also articulated specific policies relating to court interpreters.
Court Administrative Rule 52 states that:
(a) Statement of Policy. It is the policy of the Supreme Court and the
intent of these rules to secure the rights, constitutional and otherwise, of
persons who, because of a non-English-speaking cultural background or
physical impairment, are unable to understand or communicate
adequately in the English language when they appear in the courts, are
involved in court proceedings, or are otherwise seeking access to the
courts.
(b) Definitions. For the purpose of these rules, the following words have
the following meanings:
(6) "Non-English-speaking person" means any principal party in interest or
witness whose communication or understanding in the English language
does not permit effective participation in a court proceeding.

(e) Interpreter oath. All court interpreters, before commencing their
duties, shall take the following oath:
"Do you solemnly swear or affirm that you will interpret and/or translate
accurately, completely, and impartially, using your best skill and judgment
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Idaho

in accordance with the standards prescribed by law and the Idaho Code of
Professional Responsibility for Interpreters in the Judiciary?"

(f) Removal of an interpreter in an individual case. Any of the following
actions shall be good cause for a judge to remove an interpreter: (1) being
unable to interpret adequately; (2) knowingly and willfully making false
interpretation while serving in an official capacity ...
I.C.A.R. 52. The competency of an interpreter must be challenged prior to the time he
begins translating, and it is presumed he will translate accurately. State v. PuenteGomez, 121 Idaho 702, 705 (Ct. App. 1992).

The defendant bears the burden of

negating this presumption. Id.
In the case at hand, the interpreter was administered an oath, presumably
consistent with the administrative ruie. (Tr., p.709, L.24.) The district court was alerted
to an issue with interpretation shortly after Mr. Hale began interpreting for witnesses.
Near the beginning of Ms. Orozco's testimony, defense counsel asked the interpreter,
"Do you mean all that talk is just that little bit. ... Was that her full answer?" (Tr., p.712,
Ls.10-11, 14-15.) The district court told defense counsel to not ask questions of the
interpreter.

(Tr., p.712, Ls.16-17.)

Interpretation continued for the rest of the day,

including interpretation for Mr. Orozco and another witness, Mr. Coria.
At the start of the trial the next day, defense counsel again raised concerns that
the interpreter was not providing a verbatim interpretation of the witnesses' testimony.
(Tr., p.775, L.18 - p.776, L.9.) The interpreter, Mr. Hale, was then sworn and admitted
that he did not provide an accurate or complete translation. (Tr., p.777, L.2 - p.778,
L.7.) He was not able to recall the circumstances or occasions on which he did not
interpret verbatim. (Tr., p.778, Ls.8-11.) He was sure he had not provided an accurate
translation "once or twice" during Maria Orozco's testimony and that it was less of an
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issue with Adan Coria. (Tr., p.778, Ls.12-20.} During Ms. Orozco's testimony, when
they were discussing G.O.'s truthfulness, he did not translate accurately, noting that
Ms. Orozco had discussed incidents in the past and then "kind of generally editorialize
on her opinion now." (Tr., p.778, L.21 - p.779, L.5.) He recalled that she had testified
that G.O. had always been into misbehaving and then discussed a specific instance that
he could not recall.

(Tr., p.779, Ls.14-21.)

The interpreter was then asked by the

district court if he promised to translate everything from now on verbatim; Mr. Hale
responded that he would. (Tr., p.780, L.20 - p.781, L.1.)
Defense counsel then asserted that he was being informed that the inaccurate
interpretation had occurred on more than a couple of occasions. (Tr., p.781, Ls.2-7.)
The district court stated that it was "affording [defense counsel] the opportunity to
correct the record," but that the interpreter testified under oath it only occurred on one or
two occasions, and that:
Certainly, I think the gist of Maria Orozco's testimony overall is that
the grandmother has the opinion that [G.O.] is not a truthful person. I
believe that that has been adequately communicated to the jury. So
absent a further offer of proof, I'm not inclined to do anything further at this
time.
(Tr., p.781, Ls.8-23.)
Counsel then reminded the district court of the occasion where he had mentioned
that Ms. Orozco's statement seemed far longer than the interpretation and the district
court had told him to not question the interpreter. (Tr., p.781, L.24 - p.782, L.7.) The
interpreter was then questioned about that specific incident and he admitted that that
was an occasion that he did not interpret accurately, noting that Ms. Orozco answered
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the question several times and he just provided one of the answers. (Tr., p.783, Ls:19.)
Defense counsel then made a motion for mistrial. (Tr., p.783, L.16 - p.784, L.8.)
The State objected. (Tr., p.784, L.10- p.785, L.25.) The court recognized its discretion
and found that:
Clearly, there is some evidence before this court that with respect
to the testimony of Maria Orozco, that the interpreter did not, in some
occasions, translate verbatim what it was that the witness was saying in
response to any question.
Clearly, Maria Orozco was - from the - considering the testimony
as a whole was a character witness for the defendant to testify as to his
good character. She was also a witness for the defense to testify as to
her opinion or knowledge of reputation of [G.O.] for truthfulness.
Certainly, overall, considering the testimony as a whole, the court is
convinced that the testimony that she conveyed to the jury was that she
found the defendant to be a good person, that she found [G.O.] to be
someone who is untruthful. Certainly, I think that was conveyed clearly to
the jury.
It is unknown to this court as to the extent of the testimony that
perhaps was not translated verbatim. Perhaps some of what she may
have said may have been beneficial to the defense, maybe some which
she may have said may have been beneficial to the state.
What I do know is the purpose of her testimony was to challenge
the credibility of [G.O.] and to support the character of the defendant. I
think overall her testimony has come out in that fashion.
Clearly, at this point in time the court does not find that there is while I would agree that a lack of verbatim translation should never have
occurred, the court at this point in time, based on the state of the record,
cannot say that the lack of verbatim translation was prejudicial to the
defendant absent a further offer of proof as to perhaps what testimony
was not verbatimly translated as to how that might have further bolstered
the testimony of Maria Orozco. And so at this time the court would deny
the motion for mistrial without prejudice to the defense renewing the
motion at a later date on a further offer of proof.
(Tr., p.786, L.8 - p.788, L.3.)

32

Immediately following the questioning of the interpreter he was allowed to
interpret the testimony of Silvia Orellana, the alleged victim's mother. (See Tr., p.828,
Ls.18-19, p.830, L22 (transcript refers to interpreter during Ms. Orellana's testimony).)
Mr. Orellana-Castro met his burden of alerting the district court to a problem with
interpretation and provided enough of a record to prove that the interpretation was
neither accurate or complete as is required under Idaho Code § 9-205, Idaho Criminal
Rule 28, and Idaho Court Administrative Rule 52. 5 At this point, the district court was
aware that the interpreter had violated his oath and the district court had a duty to
provide an appropriate remedy as the interpreter was working for the district court in an
official capacity. The district court's finding, that the jury heard the gist of Ms. Orozco's
testimony, was misplaced and the district court should have corrected the error.
In making this determination, the district court relied only upon Mr. Hale's
testimony that the interpretation errors occurred only a few times. While Mr. Hale was
sworn before testifying (Tr., p.777, Ls.2-3), he was also sworn to provide accurate and
complete interpretation, he openly admitted that he violated that oath, and failed to
perform his duties.

(Tr., p.709, L.24, p.777, L.2 - p.778, L.7.) As such, Mr. Hale's

credibility was critically diminished and the district court's total reliance on his
representations was misplaced.

At that point in time, the district court merely

admonished Mr. Hale to properly execute his translations in the future; asking if he
"promised" to now do the job he had previously taken an oath to perform. (Tr., p.780,
L.20 - p.781, L.1.) However, the district court had good cause to remove Mr. Hale as

The issue presented on appeal, regarding an interpreting knowingly providing
inaccurate and incomplete interpretation, is an issue of first impression in the State of
Idaho.
5

33

an interpreter under I.C.A.R. 52(f)(2): knowingly and willfully making false interpretation
while serving in an official capacity.

I.C.A.R. 52.

It should be noted that at the time

Mr. Hale was interpreting the witnesses' testimony, another interpreter was on hand
interpreting the court proceedings for Mr. Orellana-Castro.

This interpreter was not

called by the district court to assist in its investigation into the extent of the interpretation
error nor were any other steps taken to investigate the extent of the inaccurate
interpretation.
Further, the failure to provide a sufficient remedy implicated Mr. OrellanaCastro's constitutional rights. Specifically, failing to cure the interpretation error resulted
in a violation of Mr. Orellana-Castro's rights as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article l, § 13 of the
Idaho Constitution.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United State's Constitution and
Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution guarantee a right to due process of law. U.S.
CONST. amends. V and XIV, lo. CONST. art. I,§ 13. Due process requires criminal trials
to be fundamentally fair.

Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19 (1978). A trial

simply can not be fundamentally fair when the defendant's witnesses are not heard in
the same manner as the State's are due to an interpreter, while acting in his official
capacity, disregarding his oath and making the conscious choice to not properly and
completely interpret a witness's testimony.
Additionally, the interpreter's actions amount to a violation of Mr. OrellanaCastro's Sixth Amendment and Article I § 13 rights to a jury trial, to compel witnesses,
to present a defense, and to an impartial jury.
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The right to present a defense is

protected by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and made
applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, ·Jg (1967). "This right is a fundamental element of

due process of law."

Id.

The right to present a defense includes the right to offer

testimony of witnesses, compel their attendance, and to present the defendant's version
of the facts "to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies." Id. "The right to a jury trial
contained in the Sixth Amendment . . . includes the right to have the jury be 'the sole
judge of the weight of the testimony."' State v. Elmore, 228 P.3d 760, 765-66 (Wash.
2010) (quoting State v. Lane, 889 P.2d 929, 838 (\Nash. 1995) (quoting State v. Crotts,
60 P. 403, 405 (Wash. 1900))).

It is the jury's vital and exclusive role to make all

credibility determinations, a role that is also rooted in one's Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial. Although Mr. Orellana-Castro was certainly allowed to compel witnesses in his
defense, the court's appointed interpreter interfered with that right by prohibiting the jury
from hearing the complete and accurate testimony of defense witnesses, robbed them
of a full opportunity to make credibility determinations, and denied Mr. Orellana-Castro
the opportunity to present the jury with his full version of the facts.
An inaccurate interpretation cannot be properly resolved by the district court
ignoring the issue. The district court was made aware of the problem, disregarded its
discretion in overseeing the interpreter it employed, failed to remove the interpreter,
failed to investigate further into the known issue, failed to provide any workable
opportunities to correct the error or declare a mistrial. Instead, the district court chose
to allow for the violation of Mr. Orellana-Castro's rights and attempted to sweep the
issue under the rug by declaring, based solely on the testimony of Mr. Hale, that the jury
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heard enough of the defense witness's testimony to get the gist of her proffered
testimony.

However, interpreting merely the gist of a witness's testimony does not

satisfy due process and does not comply with the United States or Idaho Constitutions.
As such, it was error when the district court failed to properly address the interpretation
issue and failed to provide a remedy to correct the error.
1.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying Mr. Orellana-Castro's Motion
For A Mistrial
A motion for a mistrial is controlled by I.C.R. 29.1, which provides that, "[a]

mistrial may be declared upon motion of the defendant, when there occurs during the
trial an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the
courtroom, which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair
trial." I.C.R. 29.1 (a). The Supreme Court has held that the question on review is not
whether the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion under the circumstances
existing when the motion was made; but, whether the event or events which brought
about the motion for mistrial constitute reversible error when viewed in the context of the
entire record. State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 912 (2003); State v. Watkins,
152 Idaho 764, 765-66 (Ct. App. 2012). The decision whether to grant a mistrial rests
within the sound discretion of the district court and, absent an abuse of discretion, it will
not be disturbed on appeal.

State v. Canelo, 129 Idaho 386, 389 (Ct. App. 1996);

State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 818 (Ct. App. 1993).
Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that the district court abused its discretion in failing
to grant a mistrial. He asserts that because the district court failed to provide any other
reasonable opportunity to correct the interpretation error, granting a mistrial was the
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only way to remedy the issue. His arguments in support of this assertion can be found
in section C above and are incorporated herein by reference.

2.

The State Will Be Unable To Prove That The Denial Of Mr. Orellana-Castro's
Motion For A Mistrial Is Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
The harmless error doctrine has been defined by this Court: "To hold an error as

harmless, an appellate court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
there was no reasonable possibility that such evidence complained of contributed to the
conviction." State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) (citing Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. ·18, 24 (1967)). Where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous
objection and the appellant shows that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden
of proving the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the test
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Chapman. See State v. Perry, 150
Idaho 209, 227 (2010).
Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that the State cannot show beyond a reasonable
possibility that the failure to provide accurate interpretation of defense witnesses, called,
in part, to testify regarding both Mr. Orellana-Castro and alleged victim G.O.'s credibility
did not contribute to the convictions.

In this case, there were no witnesses to the

alleged criminal activities and no physical evidence. As such, credibility determinations
had a heightened value and it cannot be said that the error did not contribute to the
convictions.
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l 11.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Did Not Allow Mr. Orellana-Castro To
Present Evidence That G.O.'s Psychological Issues May Have Been The Result Of An
Uncharged Sexual Trauma, A Nonconsensual Sexual Encounter With Jose
A.

Introduction
During trial, Mr. Orellana-Castro made an offer of proof and requested that he be

allowed to present evidence through G.O. and her mother that G.O. had nonconsensual intercourse with a man name Jose several months after the alleged abuse
by Mr. Orellana-Castro and very close in time to her disclosure to a friend's mother that
she had been abused by Mr. Orellana-Castro. Prior to the offer of proof, the State
presented several witnesses that discussed G.O.'s mental health and attributed her
issues to suffering from a trauma.

They opined that the trauma could be suffering

sexual abuse by her step-father. Mr. Orellana-Castro asserted that evidence about the
sexual incident with Jose was necessary to show that G.O.'s psychological issues or
injuries could have been caused by another source and that he was not the source of
her psychological injuries. The district court found that 1.R.E. 412(b )(2)(A) is limited to
physical injuries and does not allow for prior sexual behavior to be admitted to show that
another individual is the source of a psychological injury. Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts
that the State put psychological injuries at issue by presenting several experts who
testified about G.O.'s mental health and drew the connection that she was suffering
from these psychological injuries as a result of Mr. Orellana-Castro's alleged conduct,
that the plain language of I.R.E. 412 does not limit "injury" to physical injury only, that
the evidence was relevant, and its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect.
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8.

Standard Of Review
The interpretation of statutes and judicial rules is a matter of free review. State v.

Herrera, 149 Idaho 216, 222 (Ct. App. 2009).

The decision whether to admit 412

evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Self, 139 Idaho 718, 721-722
(Ct. App. 2003).

However, questions of relevancy are reviewed de nova.

MacDona!cJ, 131 Idaho 367, 369 (Ct. App. 1998).

State v.

Once deemed relevant, the

determination of probative value outweighing the prejudicial effect is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. MacDonald, 131 Idaho at 369. When a trial court's discretionary
decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to
determine:

(1) whether the lower couri correctly perceived the issue as one of

discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion
and consistent with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and
(3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v.
Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Did Not Allow Mr. OrellanaCastro To Present Evidence That G.O.'s Psychological Issues May Have Been
The Result Of An Uncharged Sexual Trauma, A Nonconsensual Sexual
Encounter With Jose
A Motion for Leave to Offer Evidence of [G.O.]'s Reputation Pursuant to Rules

405 and 412 was filed. (R., pp.114-115.) The original offer of proof discussed that the
defense may want to discuss some of G.O.'s sexual history. (R., pp.116-117.)
The State presented the testimony of several witnesses who provided counseling
or mental health assessments for G.O. The first of such witnesses was Joan Kauffman.
(Tr., p.439, Ls.1-9.) Ms. Kauffman conducted an interview of G.O. at CARES and had
G.O. complete a trauma screening checklist.
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(Tr., p.448, L.14 - p.458, L.9.) G.O.'s

results showed that she had "very high" anxiety and depression, some anger, worry
about someone killing her, a bit of "suicide worry," a lot of sexual preoccupation, and
"very high" sexual distress. (Tr., p.458. Ls.2-9.) Ms. Kauffman went on to say that the
answers provided by G.O. showed that she had "a lot of confusion, a lot of fears," "a lot
of self hatred maybe or worrying about I want to kill myself, wanting to hurt myself, and,
you know, feeling afraid somebody might kill me," "a lot of anxiety and depression, posttraumatic stress, disassociation," is very concerned about what is going on sexually,
and has "very significantly high ... sexual distress." (Tr., p.463. Ls.20-25, p.465, Ls.17.)

CARES referred G.O. for counseling, also made a mental health referral, and

encouraged her to "get some medication for her depression." (Tr., p.47·1, Ls.9-17.)
Dr. Rick Yuvruian, a psychiatrist with St. Luke's Behavioral Heath, completed a
standard psychiatric evaluation of G.O. (Tr., p.496, Ls.1-25.) Dr. Yuvruian diagnosed
G.O. with depression not otherwise specified and post-traumatic stress disorder

(hereinafter, PTSD). (Tr., p.503, Ls.14-17, p.507, Ls.14-22.) He also noted that she did
have some anxiety, but not enough for a separate diagnosis, she has some suicidal
ideation, and reported a history of cutting behavior. (Tr., p.508, Ls.10-13, p.510, Ls.1218, p.512, Ls.6-13.) In diagnosing PTSD, Dr. Yuvruian noted that G.O. said that she
had nightmares and flashbacks; it was unclear if they were caused by the physical
abuse she witnessed towards her mother or whether it was from sexual abuse on her.
(Tr., p.506, Ls.9-23.)
Eric Call, a licensed clinical social worker, completed a mental health
assessment on G.O. (Tr., p.534, Ls.1-23.) He diagnosed G.O. with major depression,
severe with psychotic features, and PTSD. (Tr., p.536, Ls.11-17.) The symptoms G.O.
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reported in relation to depression were feeling depressed more often that not, not being
able to sleep, change in appetite, weight loss, thought of harming herself or others, low
self-esteem, hearing voices that told her to hurt herself, and seeing images that when
they passed by her would give her chills. (Tr., p.539, Ls.7-18.) The symptoms reported
in relation to the PTSD were sexual abuse by her stepfather, nightmares, avoiding
places that reminded her of the abuse, flashbacks of the abuse, feeling different than
others because of what happened to her, lack of concentration, and that these
symptoms were affecting her functioning. (Tr., p.539, L.21 - p.540, L.2.) During her
interview, she was very tearful, became anxious at times, reported hallucinations,
reported cutting or self-harm, and noted that sometimes she thought she would be
better off dead. (Tr., p.541, Ls.15-23.) Mr. Call determined that the trauma related to
the PTSD diagnosis was the reported sexual abuse by her step-father and no other
trauma was reported to him. (Tr., p.542, Ls.4-8.) As a result of this assessment, it was
determined that G.O. qualified for programming, assistance with counseling and
medication management, and G.O. was referred to Dr. Yuvruian and Preferred Child
and Family Services. (Tr., p.542, Ls.9-15.)
Jason Beard, a therapist with Preferred Child and Family Services, discussed
general symptoms and issues that people who are the victims of sexual abuse deal
with. (Tr., p.650, L.20 - p.654, L.21.) G.O. was referred to him to discuss her reported
sexual abuse and related issues.

(Tr., p.654, L.22 - p.655, L.8.) He met with G.O.

approximately 15 times and discussed primarily the symptoms associated with the
abuse like nightmares, inability to sleep, fears, frustration that family members did not
protect or support her, and situations at school.
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(Tr., p.656, L.1 - p.659, L.6.) On

cross-examination, Mr. Beard admitted that many of the symptoms discussed could
have been triggered by another trauma such as abuse at a young age. (Tr., p.663,
Ls.7-21.)
At the start of the fifth day of the jury trial, defense counsel made a motion to
make an offer of proof regarding past sexual behavior of G.O. (Tr., p.766, Ls.22-25.)
Defense counsel stated that at the Partida quinceanera G.O. had sex with a man
named Jose. (Tr., p.767, Ls.8-12.) Jose had G.O. drink something that caused her to
lose consciousness or be dizzy and G.O. did not understand what was happening.
(Tr., p.767, Ls.13-17.) After it was over, Jose told G.O. that they had sex and G.O. has
since admitted to having sex with Jose.

(Tr., p.767, Ls.17-19.) Although G.O. has

always had problems in the past, those problems have magnified since the incident with
Jose; her symptoms of anxiety, sleeplessness, anger, and so on have increased.
(Tr., p.767, Ls.20-25.) One of the State's themes in this case is that G.O. was injured or
abused and that she suffers from mental health issues. (Tr., p.768, Ls.1-5.) This is
evidenced by her representation that she has anxiety, anger, sleeplessness, acting out,
fear of men, or, in the alternative, enhanced sexual activity.

(Tr., p.768, Ls.5-10.)

Counsel wanted to discuss the sexual activity with Jose to offer an alternative
explanation for her psychological injury and the resulting effects. (Tr., p.768, Ls.11-14.)
The State objected asserting that the injury contemplated by I.R.E. 412 is a
physical injury. (Tr., p.769, Ls.5-10.) Defense counsel responded that post traumatic
stress disorder in an injury, that several State's experts testified that it is symptomatic in
this case, that this evidence tends to explain why G.O. is suffering from these factors,
and that this information is critical to the defense's case.
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(Tr., p.770, Ls.17-24.)

Counsel elaborated that G.O. would testify that she did not realize she was having
intercourse with Jose, that it was involuntary due to the drink she was provided.
(Tr., p.771, Ls.1-6.) In effect, G.O. was raped by Jose and that once that occurred her
symptoms increased. (Tr., p.771, Ls.7-13.)
The district court recognized that whether or not to allow the evidence was a
discretionary decision and determined that under I.R.E. 412 this evidence would be
related to evidence of past behavior with persons other than the defendant to explain
the presence of semen or injury.

(Tr., p.771, L.18 - p.773, L.7.) The district court

expressed some concern that the sexual contact with Jose was not "subsequent
behavior," then determined that under I.R.E. 412, the injury must be a physical injury not
an emotional injury, and noted that the appellate courts "have not held that the defense
can create such a scenario to allow for the introduction of 412 evidence." (Tr., p.773,
L.8 - p.774, L.22.) The district court held that absence evident from the State about a
physical injury, the evidence of sexual contact between G.O. and Jose would not be
relevant under 1.R.E. 412. (Tr., p.775, Ls.7-15.)
1.

Under 1.R.E. 412(b)(2)(A) "Injury" Is Not Limited To Physical Injury And,
Therefore, Evidence Of Psychological Injuries Is Also Admissible

Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that the district court erroneously found that I.R.E.
412 contemplates only physical injuries and not psychological injuries. Idaho Rule of
Evidence 412, applicable to sex crime cases, states in pertinent part:
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in which
a person is accused of a sex crime, evidence of a victim's past sexual
behavior other than reputation or opinion evidence is also not admissible,
unless such evidence other than reputation or opinion evidence is(2) admitted in accordance with subdivision (c) and is evidence of-
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(A) past sexual behavior with persons other than the accused, offered by
the accused upon the issue of whether the accused was or was not, with
respect to the alleged victim, the source of semen or injury ....

I.RE. 412. Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that the word "injury" is not limited in the Rule to
encompass only physical injuries and that in interpreting I.RE. 412 the Court should
find that psychological injuries are also contemplated by the use of the word "injury."
When interpreting a court rule, the rules of statutory interpretation are used. See
Obendorf v. Terra Hug Spray Co., 145 Idaho 892, 900 (2008) ("We have, in the past,
applied rules of statutory construction in the interpretation of our rules of civil
procedure."). Statutory interpretation employs the following principals:
Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language of the statute. The
statute should be considered as a whole, and words should be given their
plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should be noted that the Court
must give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute so that none
will be void, superfluous, or redundant. When the statutory language is
unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be
given effect, and the Court need not consider rules of statutory
construction.
State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866 (2011) (quoting Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund,
147 Idaho 307 (2009)).
Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that the plain language does not limit the types of
injuries for which evidence can be offered under the exception and, therefore,
psychological injury evidence can also be presented under the Rule. Certainly, if I.RE.
412 was meant to include only physical injuries, the word physical could have been
easily included. For example, the corresponding Federal Rule states that:
(a) Prohibited Uses. The following evidence is not admissible in a civil or
criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct:
(1) evidence offered to prove that a victim engaged in other sexual
behavior; or
(2) evidence offered to prove a victim's sexual predisposition.
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(b) Exceptions.
(1) Criminal Cases. The couri may admit the following evidence in a
criminal case:
(A) evidence of specific instances of a victim's sexual behavior, if offered
to prove that someone other than the defendant was the source of semen,
injury, or other physical evidence ...

Fed. R. Evid. 412.

Although the Federal Rule does not specifically state "physical

injury," when read with the "or other physical evidence" portion, it is clear that the injury
evidence is limited to physical injury evidence. However, there is no similar language in
the Idaho Rule to provide such a limitation. As such, it was error for the district court to
determine that "injury" was limited to pt1ysical injury evidence and to prohibit
Mr. Orellana-Castro from providing testimony that another individual may have been the
source of G.O.'s psychological injuries.

Because the evidence fell under the I.R.E.

412(b)(2)(A) exception, the presentation of the evidence should have been allowed.
2.

The Evidence That G.O.'s Psychological Injuries Were Caused By The
Nonconsensual Contact \JVith Another Person Should Have Been Admitted

Defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. U.S. Const.
amend. VI. The right may be limited by I.R.E. 412. State v. Self, 139 Idaho 718, 722
(Ct. App. 2003). A defendant has no right to present irrelevant evidence and even if the
evidence is relevant, it may be excluded in certain cases. State v. Peite, 122 Idaho 809,
814 (Ct. App. 1992). The state has a legitimate interest in protecting victims of sex
crimes from unwarranted invasions of privacy and harassment regarding their sexual
conduct.

See Michigan

v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1991); Delaware v.

VanArsda/1, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). Admission of evidence of an alleged victim's

past sexual behavior is constitutionally required only in extraordinary circumstances.
Peite, 122 Idaho at 815.
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The Idaho State Supreme Court has set forth a two-part inquiry to determine
whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were violated by a trial court's exclusion
of evidence under I.R.E. 412. Self, 139 Idaho at 722; Peite, 122 Idaho at 814-15. First,
the trial court must consider whether the proffered evidence is relevant. Self, 139 Idaho
at 722. If it is not relevant, the defendant has no constitutional right to present it. Id. If
the evidence is relevant, the trial court must ask whether other legitimate interests
outweigh the defendant's interest in presenting the evidence. Id. Because trial courts
have such broad discretion to determine whether prejudicial effect or other concerns
outweigh the probative value of the evidence, a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights will
be violated only if the trial court abused its discretion. Id.; Peite, 122 Idaho at 815.
In the case at hand, the district court found only that the evidence did not fall
under the I.R.E. 412 exception, determined that without evidence of a physical injury the
evidence had no relevancy and did not weigh the probative value against prejudicial
effect.

Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that the evidence is admissible under I.R.E.

412(b )(2)(A) as discussed in section C( 1) above.

He also asserts the evidence was

relevant.
The State presented several witnesses whose primary purpose was to provide
evidence of the psychological injuries that were observed in G.O., the treatment that
was necessary to address these issues, and the presumed cause of the injuries, that
Mr. Orellana-Castro had sexually abused G.O. It is improper for the district court to
allow this extensive testimony and assertions that Mr. Orellana-Castro's actions are the
cause of these injuries to G.O. and then prohibit Mr. Orellana-Castro from presenting
evidence that another trauma may have been the actual cause of G.O.'s psychological
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issues. The evidence that Mr. Orellana-Castro sought to present supplied that G.O. had
been involved in a nonconsensual sexual encounter with a man named Jose prior to
receiving any of her evaluations or treatment and that this incident was the traumatic
experience that cause her psychological issues. It was the State's actions in presenting
this extensive testimony that created a situation where the evidence offered by
Mr. Orellana-Castro became highly relevant. As such, this Court should find that the
evidence is relevant.
The district court did not engage in a balancing test of the probative value versus
the prejudicial effect.

Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that the evidence that another

individual caused G.O.'s psychological injuries is highly probative as to the ultimate
issue of the trial - did Mr. Orellana-Castro have sexual contact with G.O.

This is

especially true in this case because this was a he said she said case where there was
no physical injury or witnesses to the events.

The State's presentation of several

witnesses, including trained professionals, that believed G.O. had suffered trauma,
creates a bolstering effect for G.O., a witness whose credibility was in question during
trial. If the jury was presented with information that there was another, timely, sexual
trauma, it may have had a significant impact on their determination of whether
Mr. Orellana-Castro had sexual contact with G.O.
On the other hand, there was little concern that the jury would be confused by the
testimony as G.O.'s testimony about what had allegedly occurred with Mr. OrellanaCastro was clear. Additionally, the evidence would not portray G.O. in an unfavorable
light. It was not offered to show that she was promiscuous or harm her reputation, but
show that she was a victim. As such, the probative value of the evidence outweighs
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any potential prejudicial effect.

Should this Court determine that it cannot determine

whether the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect, Mr. Orellana-Castro
asserts that his case must be remanded for the district court to perform the balancing
test.
The district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Orellana-Castro's motion to
present evidence that there was a different source for G.O.'s psychological injury
because the evidence was admissible under l.R.E. 412(b)(2)(A), it was relevant, and its
probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect. As a result, the district court violated

Mr. Orellana,-Castro's Sixth Amendment rights.
IV.
Even If The Above Errors Are Individually Harmless, Mr. Orellana-Castro's Fourteenth
Amendment Right To Due Process Of Law Was Violated Because The Accumulation Of
Errors Deprived Him Of His Right To A Fair Trial
Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that if the Court finds that the above errors were
harmless, the district court's errors combined amount to cumulative error.

The

cumulative error doctrine refers to an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by
itself might be harmless, but when aggregated, show the absence of a fair trial in
contravention of the defendant's constitutional right to due process. State v. Paciorek,
137 Idaho 629, 635 (Ct. App. 2002). In order to find cumulative error, this Court must
first conclude that there is merit to more than one of the alleged errors and then
conclude that these errors, when aggregated, denied the defendant a fair trial. State

Love/ass, 133 Idaho 160, 171 (Ct. App. 1999).

v.

Under that doctrine, even when

individual errors are deemed harmless, an accumulation of such errors may deprive a
defendant of a fair trial.

State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453 (1994 ).
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However, a

finding of cumulative error must be predicated upon an accumulation of actual errors.

State v. Medina, 128 Idaho 19, 29 (Ct. App. 1996).
Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that the district court's errors in his trial amounted to
actual errors depriving him of a fair trial. His arguments in support of this assertion are
found in sections I - Ill above, and need not be repeated, but are incorporated herein by
reference.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Orellana-Castro respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgments of
conviction and remand his cases for a new trial. Additionally, he requests that upon
remand his cases be severed and that the trials for the charges related to G.O. and
S.O. proceed separately. Additionally, he requests that his judgments of conviction for
Counts II and IV be vacated and remanded for a new trial in which Mr. Orellana-Castro
will be able to present evidence that the nonconsensual sexual encounter with another
man was the result of G.O.'s psychological injuries.
DATED this

th day of January, 2015.

IZABETH ANN ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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